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Abstract
Welfare concerns what matters to animals from their point of view. What matters to animals
is their state of need. Satisfaction and frustration of needs are associated with emotional
states, the subjective experience of which directly determines the welfare status of an ani
mal. Because emotional states are difficult to assess, overall welfare assessment (OWA) is
best approached as an assessment of needs.
For actual OWA a list of needs must be formulated. Different authors have formulated dif
ferent lists. From these lists a concept need-list was constructed. For validation the needs
based approach for OWA was discussed in interviews with experts (n = 21) in the field of
ethology and other welfare related sciences. These experts generally used mental terminolo
gy to define welfare, but when asked to classify their definition of welfare, many preferred a
definition in terms of measurable parameters or a combination of both mental terms (feel
ings) and measurables. Most experts believed that welfare can be assessed objectively and
that the problem of OWA is indeed best approached through an assessment of needs. Experts
differ as to the exact composition of the list of needs. A list of needs is formulated which we
intend to use for OWA in the case of sows.
Keywords: interviews, expert, animal welfare assessment model, pigs.

Introduction

This paper is the third and last of a series on the topic of overall farm-animal welfare
assessment (OWA). These papers highlight three areas of concern.
The first paper (Bracke et al., Part 1) dealt with the methodological question
whether OWA is possible in principle. We defined welfare as what matters to ani
mals from their point of view. This means that the welfare status of an animal is fully
determined by the quality of its emotional states, including their sign (positive or
Netherlands Journal ofAgricultural Science 47 (1999)

307

M.B.M. BRACKE, B.M. SPRUIJT AND J.H.M. METZ

negative), intensity and duration. A major problem is how the private minds of ani
mals can be assessed by scientific methods (Nagel, 1974; Dawkins, 1993, 1998;
Mason & Mendl, 1993). We suggested to regard OWA as the attempt to make the
best possible assessment based on what is known scientifically. Accordingly, OWA
is conceived as the descriptive activity that involves multi-criteria decision making
with fuzzy information. Based on these considerations we believe that OWA is pos
sible, but the question remains how it should be done in a systematic and explicit
way.
The second paper (Bracke et al., Part 2) reviewed assessment tables and schemes
that have been published to find useful recommendations as to how OWA may be
performed. The basic format for OWA was identified as a table in which housing
systems (in columns) are compared and evaluated using a list of criteria (welfare rel
evant attributes, in rows). This assessment table must be linked with other (support
ing) tables to make OWA fully explicit.
The present paper deals with the problem of how OWA can be performed on a sci
entific basis. The suggestion is that overall welfare can be assessed from an assess
ment of needs. We have applied this idea and constructed a prototype decision sup
port system, which is a computer-based information system that was designed to ex
amine the feasibility of performing OWA in a systematic way (Bracke et al., 1999).
Because performing OWA on the basis of an assessment of needs is a very basic as
sumption, we conducted interviews to examine the degree of consensus for this as
sumption. The results of these interviews will be presented in this paper. The aims of
this paper are to specify how overall welfare assessment (OWA) can be performed on
the basis of biological needs, to examine the degree of consensus among experts for
such a needs-based approach and to specify a list of needs that may be used for actu
al OWA in pigs.

A biological basis for welfare
Biological organisms are regulated by homeostatic control mechanisms which sup
port survival and reproduction in the environment of evolutionary adaptation (EEA).
The higher vertebrates are goal-directed (Toates, 1986). They have a number of more
or less distinct motivational systems. These systems, which we call needs, can be
thought of as intervening variables which have functionally related sets of behav
iours or physiological responses that can be activated by a certain class of stimuli
and deactivated by a specific event or behaviour. Classical examples of motivational
systems are hunger, thirst, sex and thermoregulation. Each motivational system
serves a proximate goal (reference point, set point or Sollwert). These goals have
been formed in the course of evolution and are, therefore, strongly similar for indi
viduals of the same species (Wiepkema, 1987). In order for responses to be function
al in achieving the goal the animal surveys its environment and compares Sollwert
(the goal) and Istwert (the actual state of the world). Discrepancies between Istwert
and Sollwert cause activation of behavioural and physiological responses with the
aim of reducing the discrepancy and restoring homeostasis. The degree of the dis308
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crepancy may vary (i.e. the animal may be more or less hungry, thirsty etc.), and
changes in this 'central motivational state' (Toates, 1986), which we call 'state of
need', give rise to observable changes in behaviour and physiology (e.g. when more
hungry the animal may run faster toward food).
Higher vertebrates show certain flexibility in the way they achieve their goals, i.e.
they can take different courses of action to obtain a certain goal. This flexibility also
requires that animals must monitor the effectiveness of their responses. Emotions,
such as pleasure and fear, are functional elements in this monitoring process, in that
they strengthen (when positive) or weaken (when negative) the use of a particular be
havioural or physiological response (Fraser & Duncan, 1998). Emotions are causally
related to behaviour (e.g. Dawkins, 1993; Broom, 1998). They function as signals in
the brain to coordinate the responsiveness in a certain direction. These signals pro
duce a coordinated state which is generally appropriate for coping with categories of
challenges (e.g. danger). Such a state is recognised by the animal. For example, the
higher vertebrates are able to recognise these internal emotional states as is shown
by their ability for so-called drug-discrimination learning, which is a much used
technique to investigate the subjective effects of drugs on the control of behaviour
(Overton, 1991).
Positive reward occurs in cases where discrepancies between Istwert and Sollwert
are reduced or minimised. Animals are attracted to objects and events associated
with positive reward (positive emotions). Events or stimuli that are rewarding act as
reinforcers, in the sense that they tend to strengthen a response. Conversely, negative
emotions (aversions) occur when discrepancies between Istwert and Sollwert in
crease in magnitude or continue to exist. Animals will attempt to avoid such situa
tions, which they find aversive. Especially negative is stress, i.e. '(a) a protracted
failure of the animal to maintain alignment between its reference values and the ac
tual state of the world and (b) the absence of an assessment of near-future realign
ment' (Toates, 1995, p. 3 1).
Because animals have different needs and because they often cannot serve differ
ent goals at the same time, animals also have regulatory mechanisms to solve cases
of conflict between them. For example, an animal may have to choose between food
and escape from danger. Animals are generally very well able to make 'decisions'
among different possible courses of action. Such decisions involve a cost-benefit
evaluation, which requires a common currency (McFarland, 1989). Most likely, this
common currency is the rewarding value that represents the expected benefits of
each alternative course of action. In this model, animals, like humans, are supposed
to act so as to maximise positive affective states and minimised negative ones. They
maximise reward (Cabanac, 197 1). This implies that animals themselves assess their
different states of need and this overall assessment constitutes their welfare.
OWA based on needs

From the argument above it follows that for overall welfare assessment (OWA) the
various states of need of an animal must be assessed and integrated as much as posNetherlands Journal ofAgricultural Science 47 (1999)
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sible in the way the animals themselves perform the assessment. Below, we will
specify the concept of 'needs' further.
An important distinction is between instrumental and intrinsic relevance. Instru
mentally relevant are those aspects that are a means to the end of OWA; i.e. they are
relevant because they give information about other aspects which are more intrinsi
cally relevant. Intrinsic aspects are ends in themselves. For example, straw is instru
mental for pig welfare, because it provides substrate to root. Rooting is intrinsically
relevant when rooting is itself rewarding. Rooting would be instrumentally relevant
if it were only a means to an end, e.g. a means to obtain food. In the latter case straw
could be regarded as intrinsically relevant if it had a dietary value for pigs. The pri
mary task for OWA is to determine what is intrinsically relevant for welfare and how
these are affected by other aspects in an instrumental way.
Intrinsically relevant for welfare are all and only the emotional states of animals
(Bracke et al., Part I). However, it is difficult to assess the sign (positive or nega
tive), intensity and duration of all emotional states separately. More suitable for an
objective assessment of welfare is the assessment of needs. If emotions represent a
state of the organism which has a biological function for a particular need, that state
must be accessible for measurement and this indirectly reveals an aspect of the sub
jective state of the animal. For operationalisation of OWA we postulate a (positive)
(cor)relation between biological functioning and subjective welfare. This postulate
receives general support in the scientific literature (e.g. Broom, 1998; Duncan,
1993; see also Fraser et al., 1997), but exceptions (which we will discuss below)
have also been recognised. Under the assumption that the state of need is a direct re
flection of how animals subjectively experience this state emotionally, we may re
gard needs as intrinsically relevant in the assessment of welfare. They can be as
sessed objectively and this provides the scientific basis for OWA.
It follows that only proximate needs are intrinsically relevant for welfare. Welfare
concerns the proximate causation of behaviour, rather than its ultimate function. Ul
timate goals such as survival and reproduction have shaped proximate needs in the
course of evolution, but survival and reproduction per se do not matter to animals
from their point of view (Duncan & Petherick, 199 1). For example, what matters to a
female animal in oestrus is a proximate need to mate, rather than the ultimate goal of
fertilisation. Because our concept of needs for OWA is closely linked to emotional
states, it is very similar to, but more general than, animal 'wants' (cf. Duncan &
Petherick, 1991; Duncan, 1996). It is also similar to Rollin's concept of Telos (e.g.
Rollin, 1990), when conceived as the genetically and environmentally constrained
nature of animals, 'from which flow certain interests and needs, whose fulfilment
matter to the animal' (p. 203). For the same reason, our concept of needs differs
from the concept of needs as suggested by Hurnik and collaborators (Hurnik &
Lehman, 1985, 1988; Hurnik, 1993). For example, longevity may be instrumental in
OWA, but it is not intrinsically relevant, because animals do not have the concepts of
life and death (Webster, 1995, p. 15).
Motivational systems are complex systems. For example, reaching satiety is regu
lated by various internal and external feedback signals, including the energetic value
of the food as well as oropharyngeal signals associated with palatability, chewing
310
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and swallowing. Needs, such as the need for food, can be often be decomposed fur
ther into component set-points. As a result, OWA can be regarded at a conceptual
level (cf. Stafleu et al., 1996), as a hierarchical assessment: welfare can be decom
posed into a set of needs which can be decomposed further into component set-point
states, from which welfare can be assessed.
In the literature general consensus exists that an aggregate of several different
measures should be used to assess welfare (e.g. Broom & Johnson, 1993). In fact
many attributes (characteristics, aspects) of housing and management affect the wel
fare status of farm animals. In order to specify how these attributes affect welfare, a
needs-based approach seems the most appropriate (cf. also Dawkins, 1998). It offers
an organising principle and provides a way to check whether the list of welfare rele
vant attributes is complete. In addition, a risk in OWA is that one component is taken
for the whole (Rushen, 199 1). The single most important reason to use a needs
based approach for OWA is that it supports assessment of welfare overall: it helps to
identify welfare problems (frustrated needs) and it helps to identify gaps in our sci
entific knowledge (to assess the state of need properly).
Scientific paradigms

An assessment of the state of need includes an assessment of the degree of positive
and negative reward, the animal's motivational strength to obtain those rewards and
the duration of the relevant emotional states. Each need state can be assessed on a
scale that ranges from maximum frustration to maximum satisfaction of that need.
To assess these needs we must use information about environmental conditions, and
empirical information from ethology and physiology (including production and
patho-physiology). These can be regarded as different perspectives that provide rele
vant information to assess a state of need. In addition a subjective, psychological
perspective can also be identified that specifies the nature of the emotional states.
The psychological perspective and the various perspectives constituted by the empir
ical sciences are different perspectives on the same phenomenon, the state of need.
The problem of OWA is to show how welfare, as defined from this psychological
perspective at the conceptual level, can be assessed at the explanatory and opera
tional levels (see Stafleu et al., 1996) while using only empirical information. We
suggest that the various scientific paradigms allow the formulation of assessment
rules that can be used for this purpose.
Scientific measures relevant for OWA include feral data, preference tests (time
budgets and choice experiments), operant techniques (including demand curves),
measures of aversion and suffering, measures of the consequences of deprivation on
behaviour, stress-physiology, pathology and production. These measures indicate
what animals normally, naturally or experimentally are inclined to approach or avoid,
how important their preferences are to them and how well animals are able to adapt
or cope. Problems exist with the interpretation of all measures (Rushen, 1991; Ma
son & Mend!, 1993; Dawkins, 1998). For example, feral data may be criticised in
that nature may be romantic but cruel (Dawkins, 1980); what animals chose may not
Netherlands Journal ofAgricultural Science 47 (1999)

3ll

M.B.M. BRACKE, B.M. SPRUIJT AND J.H.M. METZ

always be what is best for their health (Duncan & Dawkins, 1983); and coping ani
mals may still be suffering (Mendl, 1991). Problems of interpretation have been con
sidered difficult to resolve. However, such problems typically involve cases where
different scientific paradigms are in conflict with each other with respect to OWA.
We suggest taking a consensus-oriented approach for OWA. Despite the fact that
much remains to be discovered, much knowledge that is relevant for OWA has been
collected over the last decades. OWA concerns the attempt to make the best possible
assessment based on the knowledge that is available (Bracke et al., Part 1). We be
lieve the available knowledge is sufficient to allow a reasonably accurate assess
ment. Similarly, despite difficulties in the interpretation of all scientific paradigms,
each paradigm can be expected to capture at least part of the truth. This allows the
formulation of assessment rules in relation to each paradigm. Every assessment rule
includes a 'prima facie' clause indicating that the rule is valid for the most part and
other things being equal. For example, prima facie, the more natural the behaviour,
the better welfare (e.g. Wemelsfelder, 1997). Similarly for the other paradigms in
cluding predictability and controllability (Wiepkema, 1982, 1987; Wiepkema &
Koolhaas, 1993), fitness (e.g. Fraser & Broom, 1990) and consumer demand theory
(Dawkins, 1983).
However, from the conclusion above that OWA should be in accordance with wel
fare assessment as performed by the animals themselves it follows that of all scien
tific paradigms the study of preferences of animals takes a special place. For OWA
we must answer the questions 'what do animals want, i.e. what do they find reward
ing and/or aversive?' and 'How important is the satisfaction of these wants or needs
for them?'. Other scientific paradigms, e.g. studies of natural behaviour or stress
physiology have a more supportive function in that they provide additional informa
tion about proximate needs.
For every 'prima facie' assessment rule we also expect to find exceptions, which
become evident when rules conflict. For example, the argument that nature may also
be cruel constitutes a conflict between one rule that says that natural conditions indi
cate good welfare, and the second rule that says that disease indicates poor welfare.
Nature is cruel when it subjects animals to disease. Such a conflict between assess
ment rules can be resolved when, in accordance with our definition of welfare, the
primacy of the animal's emotional states is recognised: nature is good provided the
animal doesn't experience poor health. Further specifications can be expected. For
example, poor health indicates poor welfare, but an abdominal tumour may not be
associated with negative emotional states. If so, again, the assessment rule should be
refined. This revision of assessment rules into more and more specific rules may be
come very complicated and difficult. At some point we may have to stop formulating
more and more specific rules. At such a point, these rules can be used as heuristic
rules for OWA. As heuristic rules they will allow a most reasonable assessment of
welfare despite the fact that some assessment errors will inevitably be made. Since
large numbers of attributes are involved in OWA the use of heuristic rules may be the
most rational approach to OWA until further research can provide a more complete
set of specific assessment rules.
312
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Types of needs

It is beyond the scope of this paper to specify the different set points of animals, also
because they tend to be very (species, age, sex) specific. However, we will attempt to
specify which needs farm animals have.
Animals have many control systems that are designed to obtain or maintain a cer
tain (local) goal or set point. Not all control systems are equally relevant for welfare,
because they are not all equally associated with emotional states. Emotional states
especially arise when the attention of the whole animal and a close monitoring of the
efficiency of responses is required. We will call needs associated with such systems
'cognitive'. Other systems are more under autonomic regulation. Examples include
many processes at cellular and tissue level, but also the immune system, the regula
tion of heart rate and respiration. These autonomic systems are either largely inter
nally organised or only use rather stable environmental factors (such as oxygen).
They don't require additional emotional states for normal regulation. However, when
autonomic regulation fails, emotional states do occur even in these systems, e.g. by
general symptoms of fatigue or illness. It follows that for welfare both types of con
trol are relevant, but they are not relevant to the same degree. The tolerance for devi
ations between actual state (Istwert) and set point (Sollwert) is generally much lower
where emotional states are involved which deal with (more fluctuating) environmen
tal events. It is those needs that have an association with emotional states that are es
pecially relevant and functional for welfare. However, although some needs are more
important than other needs, they cannot be classified into necessities and luxuries,
because their importance ranges over a continuum and because their relative impor
tance may vary according to the circumstances.
Needs can also be classified into appetitive (e.g. hunger, thirst, sex) and aversive
systems ( e.g. fear and aggression) (cf. Toates, 1986). Appetitive needs have a special
subclass of needs: the ethological needs. Ethological needs are those needs where
the performance of behaviour is intrinsically rewarding, rather than, or in addition
to, the attainment of some functional end-point that is normally associated with the
performance of that behaviour. For example, rooting of pigs is itself rewarding, even
when the normal consequences associated with this behaviour, i.e. food, is provided
ad lib. Ethological needs concern activities that are essential in the environment of
evolutionary adaptation (EEA). They are regulated by being positively rewarding,
for example because the ultimate goal is beyond the cognitive capacities of the ani
mal or because it would be disadvantageous to stop the behaviour in the absence of
immediate functional consequences. According to Toates ( 1995) it is now generally
accepted that animals indeed are motivated to perform certain species-specific be
haviours (however see also Baxter 1983) and that reward value is associated with the
ability to perform these behaviours.
The above distinctions (appetitive-aversive, cognitive-autonomic and ethological)
result in the following classification of needs. Appetitive cognitive needs include
food, water, sex, rest and social contact. This class shows overlap with appetitive
ethological needs such as exploration, play and body care related needs. Appetitive
autonomic needs include thermoregulation and respiration. Aversive autonomic
Netherlands Journal ofAgricultural Science 47 (1999)
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needs include health and no injury. Fear is an aversive cognitive need. This classifi
cation is tentative and provides an ordering principle, rather than an absolute classi
fication.
Needs have also been classified into those needs that are largely internally moti
vated (e.g. food, water, ethological needs) and those that are largely externally moti
vated (e.g. aggression, predator avoidance). However, it is now generally recognised
that all needs have both internal and external factors. Like the internal-external dis
tinction the distinctions we use in our classification (appetitive-aversive; cognitive
autonomic; ethological) do not create mutually exclusive categories, but are differ
ences that vary over a continuum and often (if not always) include elements of both
extremes. Even within needs some elements may fit in one class, while other ele
ments fit better in another class. For example, vasoconstriction and vasodilatation as
part of thermoregulation are under autonomic control while nestbuilding, which is
also part of thermoregulation, may be an ethological need. Although our classifica
tion is only tentative, we will use it as stepping stones that should not obstruct flexi
bility in the assessment procedure.
Interviews with experts

In order to perform actual OWA we have built a prototype welfare-model for pigs
(more specifically for pregnant sows; Bracke et al., 1999). In this model we assessed
overall welfare using a list of needs. To explore the degree of consensus for this
model 21 experts from 8 different countries were interviewed about their concept of
welfare and about needs. Together 11 Dutch experts, 9 experts from other European
countries and one North-American expert were included with expertise in the fields
of general farm animal welfare, fundamental ethology, physiology, veterinary sci
ence and experimental psychology (fields listed in the order of importance). All ex
perts were scientists.
Issues that specifically concern weighting of welfare components were explicitly
excluded from these interviews, because our aim was to explore the degree of con
sensus for the assumption that logically precedes weighting, namely using needs for
OWA. We wanted to know whether our concept of welfare was in accordance with
expert opinion, and whether OWA may be performed as a function of need states.
Three questions were asked about the concept of welfare and two questions were
asked about needs.
I . How do you define welfare?
2. What type of welfare definition do you favour, in terms of measurable parameters
or in terms of feelings?
3. Can welfare be assessed objectively?
4. What are the components of welfare and what is your opinion about the prototype
need-list (which was presented to the expert, cf. Table 1)?
5. Do you believe OWA based on an assessment of needs is the proper way to pro
ceed?
314
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In response to the first question relatively few experts cite definitions from the liter
ature: five experts cited three definitions. A common characteristic of the defini
tions as stated by the experts is that they all make reference to biological function
ing. Furthermore, the importance of subj ective feelings showed as follows: 18 out of
21 experts used mental terminology, 2 experts refused to give a definition of welfare
and only 1 expert completely refrained from using mentalistic terminology in his
first stated definition. However, when asked what type of definition was preferred
(question 2), 9 experts favoured a definition in terms of measurable parameters over
subj ective feelings; 8 experts preferred a combination of both feelings and measur
able parameters, and only 4 experts favoured feelings. 18 Experts answered that wel
fare can be measured at least in part objectively, while 3 experts stated that welfare
cannot be measured objectively (question 3). This suggests that, while subjective
feelings are considered important for welfare conceptually, scientists, as a group, be
lieve welfare c an be assessed objectively.
The components of welfare were discussed with the help of the prototype list of
needs as specified in the first column of Table 1. The interviewer explained that this
list was not intended as a hierarchical ordering of behavioural elements, but that its
function was to ' break down' the complex problem of welfare into manageable
chunks which could support OWA. This implies that each component in the list must
be necessary for assessing welfare overall . For example, health, food, water, and
thermocomfort are not the only needs, because there may be a social welfare prob
lem. So, this social component must be added to the list, etc.
Responses to this list were diverse. It was said to be a standard list, but, when
asked further several remarks were obtained. One remark was that the list was not
uniform in that it puts incompatible terms on the same level, such as health, mental
terms (e. g. 'no fear', 'no pain ' ) and behavioural systems. A common denominator
would be preferable. Furthermore, the concept of a hierarchy of needs was chal
lenged on the grounds that components will overlap and that every hierarchy is nec
essarily artificial. Furthermore, experts differed with respect to the classification of
needs and their definition. For example, some experts classified rooting as part of
the need for food, but other experts classified it as a separate need. While several ex
perts identified the need for stimulation as a separate need that refers to environmen
tal complexity and novelty, the frustration of which can be expressed as apathy (as in
Wemelsfelder, 1993), other experts argued that the need for stimulation reduces to
other needs, such as exploration, locomotion and social contact. Despite these differ
ences a consensus area could also be identified. For example, all experts included
the needs for food, water, rest, social contact and thermocomfort.
At the end of the interview we asked the expert to state his/her opinion about the
suggestion to assess overall welfare as a function of need states (question 6). Most
experts ( 17 out of 21) had a positive attitude toward this suggestion; 2 experts
showed a neutral attitude, saying that it may be possible to do so, and 2 experts tend
ed to be negative about this approach.
With respect to expert opinion about needs, we conclude that, although not with
out difficulties and opportunities for further improvement, broad consensus exists
for a scientific approach to OWA based on needs.
Netherlands Journal ofAgricultural Science 47 (1999)
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Table I . Overview of need lists for welfare assessment (Author, publication year, focal species and focal attention). The lists are ordered hierarchically
in two levels. The first-level items are stated in bold. As much as possible, corresponding terms have been put on the same row. '-' indicates that an as
pect, which is found iil other lists, appears to be missing in the present list. Dotted lines indicate clusters of needs, namely appetitive cognitive, appeti
tive ethological, appetitive autonomic, aversive autonomic and aversive cognitive needs (see text).
Bracke et al

Prototype list
Pigs
Needs
Food
Water
Rest
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Reproduction

Revised list
Pigs
Needs

Baxter & Baxter

Schlichting & Smidt Sundrum et al.

Pigs, sheep, cattle
Maintenance

Pigs
Needs

Pigs
Behaviour systems

Farm animals
Influencing areas

Poultry
Maintenance

Ingestion

Ingestion

Ingestion

Intake

Ingestion

Rest
Social contact
Reproduction

Rest
Association

Rest
Social

Rest
Social

Rest
Social'

Food
Water

1983

Feed
Drink
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Hunger
Thirst
Sleep
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Fraser ( 1 983) includes locomotion, play and stretching into 'Kinesis' .
Fraser ( 1 983) includes individual space, home range and feeding rang into 'Territorialism'.
Taylor et al., ( 1 995) include hierarchy formation, allelomimetic behaviour, peer bonding, reproductive and maternal behaviour in the social mainte-
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List of needs
For the purpose of actual OWA it is necessary to have a specified list of needs. Table
1 shows various lists of needs (Fraser, 1983; Baxter & Baxter, 1984; Schlichting &
Smidt, 1989; Sundrum et al., 1994; Taylor et al., 1995). This table shows clear dif
ferences between authors. Most often ' left out' are items concerning respiration, ter
ritorialism, health and items related to reproduction. In addition, the hierarchical or
ganisation differs; e.g. play is part of kines is for Fraser ( 1983) and part of explo
ration for Schlichting & Smidt (1989). F urthermore, different terms are used to de
note overlapping concepts, for example ' body care' and 'comfort' . Conversely, simi
lar terms may be used for partly diverging concepts. For example, Fraser's list con
tains territorialism, which includes various aspects of space, namely individual
space, home range and feeding range. Others do not include territorialism in their
list, but have incorporated these aspects into other components such as social con
tact, locomotion and ingestion. These differences illustrate the importance of stan
dardisation and unifying definitions in the field of OWA. However, maybe even
more important for OWA is that Table 1 also identifies underlying consensus. It con
firms that these authors believe needs are important constituents of welfare and that
the list of needs for OWA includes ingestion (food and water), thermoregulation,
rest, social contact, kinesis, exploration and body care/comfort. In addition to these
needs, needs related to fear/avoidance and sex are also well established (Toates,
1986).
We made some minor revisions in our prototype list of needs for actual OWA in
the case of pigs (see Table l ) . The revised list does no longer contain the subjective
terms ' no fear' and ' no pain' . As a common denominator we have chosen motiva
tional systems. Although further revision may prove necessary, this list provides the
starting point for development of a tool to assess the overall welfare-status of pigs. It
contains the elements that we believe to be necessary to assess the overall welfare
status of pigs.
The revised l ist incl udes the following needs: ingestion (incl uding the need for
food and water), rest, social contact, reproduction-related needs (sex, nest building
and maternal care), kinesis, exploration (including exploration of novelty, foraging
and play), body care, evacuation, territorialism, thermocomfort, respiration, health
(including no injuries or pain) and safety (including ' no danger' and ' no aggres
sion').
Specific for pigs are behavioural elements such as rooting, nest building, wallow
ing and the ability to separate the resting from the elimination area. For application
to other species or to specific subgroups (e.g. pregnant sows or growing pigs) espe
cially ·the ethological needs require modification. Below, we will discuss the needs
that are relevant for welfare assessment in pregnant sows.
Body-care concerns the behavioural elements of scratching (grooming) and wal
lowing in pigs. Evacuation concerns the eliminative behaviour that is specific to
pigs, namely to separate the resting area from the elimination areas, and, possibly, to
mark the home range.
The need to explore conc erns the active behavioural processes by which an animal
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assimilates information about its environment. Exploration is especially evoked by
mild disparity between sensory input and stored representations or expectations. (A
larger disparity results in fear and avoidance, which we have classified under ' safe
ty' .) Two major components of exploration are the need to explore novelty and the
need to forage (rooting in pigs). Foraging is appetitive feeding behaviour. As such it
could be argued to be part of the need for food. However, scientific data concerning
contrafreeloading, where animals have been shown to work for food even when ad
lib food is available, support a classification of foraging as a separate need. Since re
cent evidence suggests that foraging may be part of the need to explore or to gather
information (Bean et al., 1998), we have classified rooting as part of the need to ex
plore. Play has also been subsumed under exploration, because a main function of
play involves learning.
The need to move, kinesis, may not be controlled by a separate control system. In
stead it may be argued that it is part of various other needs, e.g. exploration. Howev
er, since there seems universal consensus that space and the ability to move are im
portant components of welfare, we incorporate the need for kinesis as a separate
functional element in the need list.
In line with other authors we include respiration as a separate need (cf. Table I ).
Baxter & Baxter ( 1984) defined respiration as the need ' to prevent the sow feeling
asphyxiated or choked' (p. 283). This need has its own control centre in the brain
and accordingly may classify as a separate need. However, it may also be subsumed
under ' safety' or under ' health' as noxious stimuli (e.g. NH3 , CO2, H2S, dust lev
els), because it is probably largely under autonomic control, meaning that only gross
deviations are relevant for welfare.
The need for health is the need to be free from disease, i.e. the absence of clinical
symptoms or pathological anatomical abnormalities. It is included as a separate need
because it is related to a semi-behavioural system, namely ' sickness behaviour'
(Hart, 1988). Health is clearly associated with welfare relevant emotional states. In
addition, when activated, sickness behaviour must clearly compete for time and mo
tor output with other behaviour systems such as feeding, sex or the avoidance of dan
ger. Often sickness behaviour takes priority indicating that combating the disease is
important for the animal (and its welfare). Like other motivational systems sickness
behaviour is functional for survival (Hart, 1988). It also involves learning processes.
Examples of such learning include food aversion learning, self-narcosization to alle
viate pain and so-called antidotal thirst to alleviate sickness (reviewed in Toates,
1986, e.g. p. 76).
The need for health includes specific illnesses and inj uries. The injury sub-com
ponent captures the ' no pain' item in the prototype list. Pain and fear are related mo
tivational systems, but ' whereas the fear system is responsible for motivating escape
from a dangerous location, the pain motivational system determines the behaviour of
resting to allow recuperation.' (Toates, 1 986, p. 1 54 ).
The fear system has been renamed as the need for safety. This need is associated
with the flight/fight/fright syndrome that serves to maintain the integrity of the
whole body against potential disturbance and damage. It does not imply that the goal
is absolutely no fear. E xposure to mild or moderate fear is even thought to be benefi-
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cial (Jones, 1997). It seems to be a feature of various types of environmental stimuli
that too much as well as too little stimulation may be suboptimal for need satisfac
tion (Fraser et al., 1975, p. 655). Other examples of this phenomenon include tem
perature, food and social contact. The terms ' safety' and ' fear' are used here to de
note only one component of welfare. In a wider sense, where safety would include
aspects of health, ingestion, thermoregulation, etc., it could be interpreted to cover
(almost) the entire field of welfare. In this paper, safety denotes only one of the
classes of things that motivate animals.
Not included in our list for pigs are territorialism, predictability and control, ab
normal behaviour and stimulati on. Territorialism is an ethological need that does not
apply to pigs because pigs do not defend a territory, although they do live in home
ranges (Graves, 1984). For pigs we will subsume the aspects that are related to terri
torialism under other needs such as kinesis and exploration. Abnormal behaviour
(Schlichting & Smidt, 1989), and predictability and control (Baxter & Baxter, 1984)
are not separate needs, but seem to be more general indicators of welfare problems.
Even if the underlying motivational basis is not always well understood (e.g. Rushen
et al., 1993 ), they generally subsume under other needs. Similarly, for stimulation
we prefer to subsume it under the need to explore (novelty).
As this discussion illustrates, drawing up a list of needs requires making decisions
about issues that have not been fully resolved. It seems necessary to compare various
need lists and to examine their practical implications. However, for actual OWA it is
necessary to have a specified list. By making choices explicit we hope these issues
will be re-actualised, which in turn may lead to improved welfare assessment.
Conclusions
This paper deals with the question how OWA can be performed on a scientific basis.
We suggested to perform OWA based on an assessment of needs. A needs-based ap
proach allows welfare to be concerned with what matters from the animal's point of
view, while at the same time allowing a scientific approach. This is because the term
' need' has both subjective and objective elements in its meaning. Needs were de
fined as the states of the animal's motivational systems, which specify the animal's
proximate goals. The concept of emotional states plays a functional role, both in
channelling various kinds of input to produce an efficient response (the causation of
behaviour) as well as in constituting the animal's welfare status. However, emotional
states do not provide an immediate operational tool for OWA. By contrast, the con
cept of needs provides a more useful approach to assess welfare. A needs-based ap
proach provides the stepping stones to organise welfare relevant attributes. It also
ensures that welfare is assessed overall.
OWA requires taking into account all available scientific evidence. The various
scientific paradigms concerned with welfare all provide relevant data. In addition,
these paradigms may allow the formulation of various assessment rules. These rules
should be specified as much as possible and apparent conflicts between them should
be a reason to specify the rules in more detail. At some point these assessment rules
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may have to be used as heuristic rules for operational OWA.
Interviews with experts confirmed that feelings are an important element in the
concept of welfare, but they also confirmed that they believe welfare can be assessed
objectively and that OWA is probably best performed based on an assessment of
needs.
For actual OWA it is necessary to specify a list of needs. A list of needs for pigs
was formulated. It includes needs in relation to ingestion, rest, social contact, repro
duction, kinesis, exploration, body-care, evacuation, thermoregulation, respiration,
health and safety. This list is not final, but it will be used as a starting point to per
form actual OWA in the case of pregnant sows.
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